The Apex Court held that the period that the Central Govt. may prescribe to complete investigation u/s.212(3) is directory and no fixed period is provided for completion of investigation by SFIO; transfer of investigation by other agencies to SFIO u/s.212(2) of the Companies Act 2013 is irrevocable; when accused is directed to remand by a competent court in exercise of judicial function then the same cannot be challenged by writ of habeas corpus; and about territorial jurisdiction of High Court held that even if the arrests were effected within the jurisdiction of the High Court, since the accused were produced before a competent court in pursuance of Sections 435, 436 of the Companies Act 2013, the High Court ought not to have entertained the writ petition.
Hon’ble Supreme Court in SFIO vs. Rahul Modi and Another etc. 2019 SCC OnLine SC 423 vide judgement dt. 27/03/2019:
a) The investigation into the affairs of Adarsh Group of Companies and LLPs was assigned by the Central Government to SFIO vide Order dated 20.6.2018, per section 212(1)(c) of the Companies Act, 2013. This Order did stipulate in para 6 that the Inspectors should complete their investigation and submit their report to the Central Government within three months.
b) On 20.6.2018 itself, the Director, SFIO appointed investigating officers.
c) The period of three months expired on 19.09.2018. However, the investigation was not over.
d) The proposal to arrest three accused persons was placed by the Investigating Officers before the Director, SFIO and after being satisfied in terms of requirements of Section 212(8) of 2013 Act approval was granted by Director, SFIO on 10.12.2018.
e) After they were arrested on 10.12.2018, the accused were produced before the Judicial Magistrate, Gurugram, Haryana, who by his order dated 11.12.2018 remanded them to custody till 14.12.2018 and also directed that they be produced before the Special Court, Gurugram on 14.12.2018.
f) On 13.12.2018 a proposal seeking extension of time for completing investigation in respect of 57 cases including the present case was preferred by SFIO before the Central Government.
g) On 14.12.2018 the Special Court, Gurugram remanded the accused to custody till 18.12.2018.
h) On the same date i.e. on 14.12.2018 the proposal for extension was accepted by the Central Government in respect of the Group and extension was granted upto 30.06.2019.
i) On 17.12.2018 the Writ Petitions were preferred, inter alia, seeking prayer of writ of habeas corpus, which came up for the first time before the High Court of Delhi on 18.12.2018.
j) On 18.12.2018 itself the accused were further remanded to police custody till 21.12.2018 by the Special Court, Gurugram.
k) On 20.12.2018 Hon’ble High Court at Delhi issued notice returnable on 31.1.2019 and proceeded to consider ad interim relief for immediate release of the accused. It held arrest as illegal detention which cannot be sanctified by subsequent remand orders passed by the concerned Magistrate. And pursuant to said order, the original Writ Petitioners were released on bail. This ad interim relief was challenged by the SFIO before Hon’ble Supreme Court in the present case.
- Whether the the date with reference to which the legality of detention can be challenged in a Habeas Corpus proceeding is the date on which the return is filed in such proceedings and not with reference to the initiation of the proceedings?
Held yes, as decided by the Federal Court in Basanta Chandra Ghose vs. King Emperor (1945)7 FCR 81. Similar question was considered in Kanu Sanyal vs. District Magistrate, Darjeeling and Others (1974) 4 SCC 141. The law is thus clear that “in Habeas Corpus proceedings a Court is to have regard to the legality or otherwise of the detention at the time of the return and not with reference to the institution of the proceedings”.
Hon’ble Supreme Court also considered its recent decision of division bench in Manubhai Ratilal Patel through Ushaben vs. State of Gujarat and others (2013) 1 SCC 314; in Saurabh Kumar vs. Jailor, Koneila Jail and another (2014) 13 SCC 436 and a bench of three learned judges in State of Maharashtra and Others vs. Tasneem Rizwan Siddiquee (2018) 9 SCC 745 and held that act of directing remand of an accused is thus held to be a judicial function and the challenge to the order of remand is not to be entertained in a habeas corpus petition.
- Whether Delhi High Court have territorial Jurisdiction?
Section 435 of the Companies Act 2013 contemplates establishment of Special Courts for the purpose of providing speedy trial of offences under the said Act. Section 436 then provides that “offences specified under sub-section (1) of Section 435 shall be triable only by Special Court established or designated for the area in which the Registered Office of the Company, in relation to which the offence is committed ……”. Soon after the arrest, the accused were produced before the Judicial Magistrate, Gurugram and then before the Special Court, Gurugram. Special Court, Gurugram would be competent to deal with the matter in terms of Section 436.
However, Learned counsel for the writ petitioners, however, contend that since the accused were arrested in Delhi, were kept in custody in Delhi, and the SFIO office being in Delhi, the High Court of Delhi was competent to entertain and consider the writ petitions so preferred by the writ petitioners. Reliance was placed by them on the decision of this Court in Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra and others (2000) 7 SCC 640.
However, the Apex Court found that the judgement in Navinchandra Majithia, was not dealing with the matter. And it relied upon Dashrath Rupsingh Radhod vs. State of Maharashtra and another (2014) 9 SCC 129 and found that “It is true that the decision in Dashrath Rupsingh Radhod 15 was in the context of a criminal complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and not while dealing with an issue of maintainability of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. It cannot, therefore, be said that in the present case, the High Court completely lacked jurisdiction to entertain the petition. However, since the challenge was with respect to the detention pursuant to valid remand orders passed by the Judicial Magistrate and the Special Court, Gurugram, in our considered view, the High Court should not have entertained the challenge. If the act of directing remand is fundamentally a judicial function, correctness or validity of such orders could, if at all, be tested in a properly instituted proceedings before the appellate or revisional forum. In the circumstances even if the arrests were effected within the jurisdiction of the High Court, since the accused were produced before a competent court in pursuance of Sections 435, 436 of 2013 Act, the High Court ought not to have entertained the writ petition. “
- The period within which an investigation report is contemplated to be submitted to the Central Govt. u/s.212(3) is mandatory or directory? And where the initial Order of arrest itself was invalid then can such illegality be sanctified by subsequent Order of remand?
Under sub-Section (3) where the investigation is so assigned by the Central Government to SFIO, the investigation must be conducted in the manner and in accordance with the procedure provided in the Chapter and a report has to be submitted to the Central Government within such period as may be specified. This provision contemplates submission of a report within the period as may be specified. The subsequent provisions then contemplate various stages of investigation including arrest under sub-Section (8) and that SFIO is to submit an interim report to the Central Government, if it is so directed under sub Section (11). Further, according to sub-Section (12), on completion of the investigation, SFIO is to submit the “investigation report” to the Central Government. This report under sub-Section (12) may lead to further follow up actions. Under sub-Section (13) a copy of the “investigation report” could be obtained by any concerned person by making an application in that behalf to the Court while under sub-Section (14) on receipt of said “investigation report” the Central Government may direct SFIO to initiate prosecution against the Company. And the provisions of Section 43(2) of the Limited Liability Partnership Act, 2008 do not postulate any such period. Hon’ble Apex Court finds that Section 212(3) of 2013 Act by itself does not lay down any fixed period within which the report has to be submitted. Even under sub-Section (12) which is regarding “investigation report”, again there is no stipulation of any period. In fact such a report under sub-Section (12) is to be submitted “on completion of the investigation”. There is no stipulation of any fixed period for completion of investigation which is consistent with normal principles under the general law. For instance, there is no fixed period within which the investigation under Criminal Procedure Code must be completed.
Again, sub-Section (2) of Section 213 of 2013 Act does not speak of any period for which the other Investigating Agencies are to hold their hands, nor does the provision speak of any re-transfer of the relevant documents and records from SFIO back to said Investigating Agencies after any period or occurring of an event (unlike Section 7 of the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008). The idea under sub-Section (2) is complete transfer of investigation. The transfer under sub-Section (2) of Section 213 would not stand revoked or recalled in any contingency.
“It is well settled that while laying down a particular procedure if no negative or adverse consequences are contemplated for non-adherence to such procedure, the relevant provision is normally not taken to be mandatory and is considered to be purely directory. Furthermore, the provision has to be seen in the context in which it occurs in the Statute. There are three basic features which are present in this matter:-
1. Absolute transfer of investigation in terms of Section 212(2) of 2013 Act in favour of SFIO and upon such transfer all documents and records are required to be transferred to SFIO by every other Investigating Agency.
2. For completion of investigation, sub-Section (12) of Section 212 does not contemplate any period.
3. Under sub-Section (11) of Section 212 there could be interim reports as and when directed.”
And held that In the absence of any clear stipulation an interpretation that with the expiry of the period, the mandate in favour of SFIO must come to an end, will cause great violence to the scheme of legislation. If such interpretation is accepted, with the transfer of investigation in terms of sub Section (2) of Section 212 the original Investigating Agencies would be denuded of power to investigate and with the expiry of mandate SFIO would also be powerless which would lead to an incongruous situation that serious frauds would remain beyond investigation. That could never have been the idea. The only construction which is, possible therefore, is that the prescription of period within which a report has to be submitted to the Central Government under sub-Section (3) of Section 212 is purely directory.
And further held that therefore it cannot be said that in the instant case the mandate came to an end on 19.09.2018 and the arrest effected on 10.12.2018 under the orders passed by Director, SFIO was in any way illegal or unauthorised by law.